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The Welding Fume Case and the Preemptive 
Effect of OSHA's HazCom Standard on 
Common Law Failure-to-Warn Claims 
RICHARD C. AUSNESSt 
INTRODUCTION 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act (the OSH Act)! 
affects more than ninety million workers in the United 
States.2 The OSH Act is administered by the Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), which promul-
gates health and safety standards for the workplace. 3 
Although OSHA standards do not regulate product 
manufacturers directly, they may affect liability when 
manufacturers are sued by workers who are injured by 
allegedly defective products provided by their employers. 4 
With increasing frequency, manufacturers are contending 
that the OSH Act or OSHA standards preempt these 
claims. In particular, manufacturers argue that the Hazard 
Communication Standard (HazCom Standard)5 should 
preempt failure-to-warn claims. This issue recently came to 
t Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, 
University of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University. I would like to thank the 
University of Kentucky College of Law for its generous financial support. I 
would also like to thank David R. Cohen, who served as Special Master for the 
court in the Welding Fume case, for informing me about the significance of 
OSHA preemption litigation. 
1. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 
(2001). 
2. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAw § 4 (4th ed. 
1998). 
3. Note, A Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act: The Limitations of Punishment and Culpability, 91 YALE L.J. 
1446, 1446 (1982). 
4. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAw § 14.3, at 890-91 (2005). 
5. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2006). 
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a head in Welding Fume Products Liability Litigation, 6 
which was decided by a federal district court in 2005. 
In 2003, a large number of lawsuits against various 
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors of welding rod 
products were transferred to the Northern District of Ohio 
under the federal Multi-District Litigation Statute.7 The 
plaintiffs were injured as a result of inhaling manganese 
fumes given off during welding operations and maintained 
that the defendants had failed to adequately warn them 
about this danger.8 The defendants moved to dismiss, 
arguing that the OSH Act and the HazCom Standard 
preempted the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims.9 In April, 
2005, District Judge Kathleen O'Malley denied the 
defendants' motion and ruled that the plaintiffs' claims 
were not preempted. 10 
The issue of OSH Act preemption is one of great 
importance to the chemical industry and other product 
manufacturers. Consequently, many parties participated in 
the proceedings and argued their respective positions 
vigorously and skillfully in pretrial briefs and motions. 
Judge O'Malley's opinion in Welding Fume was 
comprehensive, well reasoned and a major contribution to 
OSH Act preemption jurisprudence. For these reasons, the 
Welding Fume case and the question of OSH Act 
preemption are worth discussing in some detail and I will 
do so in this Article. Part I describes the OSH Act and the 
HazCom Standard. Part II discusses the law of federal 
preemption, particularly those cases that involved the 
preemption of common law tort claims. Part III examines 
the preemption of state law by the OSH Act and the 
HazCom Standard. The Welding Fume case is evaluated in 
Part IV and the Article concludes by predicting that the 
decision in that case will be upheld on appeal. 
6. 364 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2005). 
7. Id. at 673. 
8. See id. 
9.Id. 
10. Id. at 682. 
THE WELDING FUME CASE
I. REGULATION UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY ACT
A. OSHA and the OSH Act
The Occupational Health and Safety Act was enacted in
1970 in response to public concern about work-related
deaths and injuries." Congress believed that many state
occupational health and safety protection laws at that time
were weak and ineffective. 12 Consequently, the federal
government intervened to "assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions."'13 The Act created two agencies, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)14
and the National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH),15
to administer the Act. NIOSH conducts research to deter-
mine the causes of occupational injuries and diseases, and
develops strategies for reducing the incidence of such work-
related injuries and diseases. 16 OSHA promulgates and
enforces the safety standards that result from NIOSH's
studies.
The OSH Act covers an estimated six million
workplaces and ninety million employees.' 7  OSHA
primarily relies on standards promulgated under section six
of the OSH Act to carry out the Act's regulatory objectives.1 8
These safety standards must adequately assure, to the
11. Note, Getting Away with Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State
Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARv. L. REV. 535, 537
(1987); see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 2, § 1, for a discussion of state and federal
regulation of occupational health and safety prior to the OSH Act.
12. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in
Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1452 (1984); Richard S. Fischer,
Note, Cooperative Federalism and Worker Protection: The Failure of the
Regulatory Model, 60 TEX. L. REV. 935, 939 (1982).
13. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)
(2001).
14. Id. § 655-70.
15. Id. § 671.
16. Id. § 671(a).
17. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 2, § 4.
18. BENJAMIN W. MINTZ, OSHA: HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 37 (1984).
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extent feasible, that no employee will suffer a material
impairment to his or her health during the course of
employment. 19 OSHA standards address both safety and
health concerns. Safety standards protect against traumatic
injuries, while health standards protect workers against
exposure to toxic substances and harmful physical agents.20
OSHA standards are also grouped into various industrial
categories, including (1) general industry;21 (2) construc-
tion;22 (3) maritime and longshoring;23 and (4) agricul-
tural. 24
OSHA enforces its safety and health standards by
means of on-site inspections. 25 Inspectors are authorized to
issue citations against employers for violations and these
can result in either civil or criminal penalties. 26 OSHA may
also require employers to keep records and report
information about the effects of hazardous substances in
the workplace. 27  This information assists OSHA in
determining which hazards pose the greatest risk of harm
to workers. 28 In addition to complying with specific safety
standards, the Act's "general duty" provision requires
employers to maintain a workplace that is "free from
recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm" to their employees.29
19. Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the
Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 807 (1981).
20. MINTZ, supra note 18, at 38.
21. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (2006).
22. Id. § 1926.
23. Id. §§ 1915, 1917, 1918.
24. Id. § 1928.
25. Note, A Proposal to Restructure Sanctions Under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act: The Limitations of Punishment and Culpability, 91 YALE
L.J. 1446, 1446 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)
(2001).
28. Kenneth J. Perrone, Note, Employee Right to Know: Should the Federal
Government or the States Regulate the Dissemination of Hazardous Substance
Information to Protect Employee Health and Safety?, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 633,
658 (1985).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). For a discussion of the general duty clause, see
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 141-52.
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The OSH Act's regulatory scheme is not exclusively
federal, but contemplates that the states will continue to
play a major role in the occupational safety and health
area. 30 For example, the Act does not override state
workers' compensation laws or other provisions that provide
compensation for occupational injuries or diseases.3 1 In
addition, the states are free to regulate in any area where
OSHA has not promulgated federal health and safety
standards. 32 Furthermore, the Act provides that states may
assume responsibility for developing their own standards
and enforcement programs by submitting a plan to OSHA
for its approval.3 3 If OSHA approves a state plan, it will
limit its activities within the state and the state plan will
govern occupational health and safety within the state. In
addition, OSHA will provide funds to the state to assist it in
implementing its plan.3 4
B. The HazCom Standard
OSHA promulgated the HazCom Standard 5 in 1983 to
ensure that employees receive the necessary information
and training to allow them to safely handle hazardous
substances in the workplace. 36 The HazCom Standard
requires chemical manufacturers and importers to evaluate
chemicals produced or imported by them to determine if
these chemicals are hazardous. 37 OSHA has determined
30. Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 495 (1993); see also AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030,
1035 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (declaring that OSHA was to carry out the Act's safety
goals by fostering a "dynamic federal-state partnership in occupational health
and safety matters").
31. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4).
32. Id. § 667(a); see also Puffer's Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 16
(1st Cir. 1984); W. Va. Mfg. Ass'n v. State, 714 F.2d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 1983);
Green Mt. Power Corp. v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 383 A.2d 1046, 1051 (Vt.
1978).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b).
34. Foote, supra note 12, at 1453.
35. 48 Fed. Reg. 53280 (Nov. 25, 1983), (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200
(2006)).
36. Perrone, supra note 28, at 648-49.
37. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(d)(1) (2006).
2006] 107
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that certain chemical substances are hazardous per se.38 If
a chemical substance is not within this designated group,
the manufacturer must evaluate the "available scientific
evidence" to determine whether it is hazardous. ' 39 If the
substance is found to be hazardous, the manufacturer or
importer must ensure that each container that leaves the
workplace is labeled with the chemical identity, with
appropriate hazard warnings, and with the name and
address of the source.
40
Manufacturers or importers must also prepare a
material safety data sheet (MSDS) that lists the chemical
common names of each hazardous ingredient and any
information that may be necessary for the safe use of the
product. 41 The manufacturer or importer must provide an
MSDS to each employer who purchases a hazardous
chemical. 42 Once an employer has received an MSDS from a
manufacturer or importer, it must develop a written hazard
communication program that includes the use of labels,
safety sheets, and employee training about the risks of
hazardous chemicals in their work area.43 The safety sheets
received from the manufacturer or importer must be kept in
the workplace and be made available to employers near the
work area during their shifts.44 Finally, employers must
inform employees of their rights under the HazCom
Standard, the availability of the MSDS, and the location of
any hazardous substances in the workplace.
45
38. Id. § 1910.1200(d)(3)-(4).
39. Id. § 1910.1200(d).
40. Id. § 1910.1200(f)(1).
41. Id. § 1910.1200(g).
42. The HazCom Standard allows an exception from the labeling and MSDS
ingredient disclosure requirements when a manufacturer or importer claims
that the chemical identity is a trade secret and sets forth a procedure for the
disclosure of trade secrets when necessary. Id. § 1910.1200(i) (2005).
43. Id. § 1910.1200(e).
44. Id. § 1910.1200(g)(8).
45. Id.
108 [Vol. 54
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III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION LAW
A. General Principles of Federal Preemption
Although the states act as sovereign entities within our
federal system, 46 Congress can prevent the states from
regulating in certain areas if it chooses. The principle by
which federal law overrides state law is known as
preemption. According to conventional wisdom, this power
to override state law derives from the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. 47 The power to preempt
ensures that federal law prevails over conflicting state
statutes, 48 local ordinances, 49 and even state common law
doctrines. 50 In general, the party seeking to invoke federal
preemption has the burden of proof on this issue.
51
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has declared that it will
46. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (characterizing the federal
system as "a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign").
47. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); see Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); Mary J. Davis, On Preemption,
Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 182-83
(2004).
48. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 99 (1992)
(declaring that the OSH Act preempts state occupational and safety standards
unless they receive federal approval); see also Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline
Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (ruling that the federal Natural Gas Act preempts
state statute purporting to regulate issuance of long-term securities by natural
gas pipeline companies); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. &
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (holding state agricultural marketing
statute preempted by federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act).
49. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640
(1973) (holding municipal airport curfew preempted by FAA regulations).
50. See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (holding
that Clean Water Act bars private nuisance actions against out-of-state
polluters); Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582-84 (1981) (holding
Natural Gas Act preempts calculation of damages under state contract
doctrines); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,
331 (1981) (ruling Interstate Commerce Act preempts state tort claim based on
abandonment of service); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270-73 (1974) (noting National Labor
Relations Act preempts certain state-law libel claims).
51. Steele v. Collagen Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 879, 888-89 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1997); Hernandez v. Coopervision, Inc., 691 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
presume that Congress would not preempt state law in
traditional areas of state concern, such as public health and
safety, unless Congress makes its intent to supersede state
law "clear and manifest. ' 52 This principle is often referred
to as the "presumption against preemption.
'53
Courts and commentators traditionally divide preemp-
tion into two basic categories, express and implied, and fur-
ther subdivide implied preemption into field preemption
and conflict preemption. 54 Express preemption occurs when
a federal statute specifically excludes state regulation in a
particular area.55 Federal agencies acting within the scope
of their delegated authority may also preempt state law by
regulation.56 Congress may impliedly preempt state law
when a federal regulatory scheme effectively occupies the
field and leaves no room for state regulation or when state
law conflicts in some way with federal law. 57 Field preemp-
tion involves a scheme of federal regulation that is so
pervasive that it effectively excludes state regulation. 58
Another form of implied preemption is known as conflict
preemption and may occur when it is impossible to comply
with both state and federal law59 or where state law stands
52. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Mary
J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV.
967 (2002); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-Emption Presumption That Never
Was: Pre-emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 1379 (1998).
53. OWEN, supra note 4, § 14.4, at 895-919; but see Davis, supra note 52, at
1013 (disputing the existence of a presumption against preemption).
54. M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety
Obligations, 21 PACE L. REV. 103, 106 (2000).
55. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)
(noting the National Association of Attorneys General airline fare advertising
guidelines); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 106-08 (1983) (ERISA
benefits); Ry. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (union
security agreements); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)
(federal warehouse regulations).
56. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (FCC cable
television regulations); see also Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1962)
(treasury regulations); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534,
544-45 (1958) (government procurement regulations); Leslie Miller, Inc. v.
Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 189-90 (1956) (government procurement regulations).
57. See Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual
and Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1150-51 (1998).
58. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1985).
59. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
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as an obstacle to the achievement of federal regulatory
objectives. 6
0
B. Preemption of Common Law Tort Claims
Federal statutes and administrative regulations can not
only preempt state and local statutes, ordinances, and
regulations, they can also preempt state common law tort
doctrines. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,61 decided in
1992, was one of the first Supreme Court cases to consider
whether a federal regulatory statute could preempt
common law tort claims. The Cipollone case was concerned
with the preemptive effect of federal labeling requirements
on tort claims against tobacco companies. 62 The Court
concluded that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act expressly preempted the plaintiffs failure-
to-warn claims, 63 but did not preempt claims based on
breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, or conspir-
acy.6
4
The Cipollone Court also made several observations
about preemption methodology: first, the Court acknowl-
edged that it must construe the statute's preemptive
language "in light of the presumption against the pre-
emption of state police power regulations."65 Second, the
Court declared that when a statute's express preemption
provision provided a "reliable indicium of congressional
intent with respect to state authority, there was no need to
infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions of the legislation."66 In other words,
the Court should limit itself to an express preemption
analysis, and not engage in implied preemption analysis,
when the statute in question contains an express
60. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987); Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n
v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
61. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
62. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Impact of the Cipollone Case on
Federal Preemption Law, 15 J. PRODS. & Toxics LIAB. 1 (1993).
63. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
64. See id. at 525-30.
65. Id. at 518.
66. Id. at 517 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
2006]
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preemption provision.67  Third, the Cipollone Court
reiterated its position that common law tort doctrines could
have the same coercive effect as statutes, ordinances, and
administrative regulations. 68 Fourth, the Cipollone Court
stated that a statute did not have to mention tort remedies
specifically in order to preempt them; instead, general
language would be sufficient to preempt common law tort
claims.69 Finally, the Court chose to examine the plaintiffs
tort claims on an individual basis, preempting some and
upholding others.7 0
Since Cipollone, the Supreme Court has reviewed a
number of other cases involving federal preemption of state
common law tort claims.7 1 For example, in Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick,72 the Court was called upon to decide
whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act 73 expressly or impliedly preempted a design defect
claim against the manufacturers of certain eighteen-wheel
tractor-trailers for failing to equip their vehicles with
antilock brakes. The truck manufacturers contended that
the federal statute and regulations adopted under its
authority preempted the plaintiffs' claims. 74 The Act
contained an express preemption provision that prohibited
state and local governments from enacting motor vehicle
safety standards unless they were identical to applicable
federal standards. 75 The Act also contained a savings clause
that declared that "[c]ompliance with [the federal] motor
vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does
67. See Stacey Allan Carroll, Note, Federal Preemption of State Products
Liability Claims: Adding Clarity and Respect for State Sovereignty to the
Analysis of Federal Preemption Defenses, 36 GA. L. REV. 797, 812-13 (2002).
68. See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 52, at 1412.
69. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520-24.
70. See Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A
Divided Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440, 1474 (1997).
71. See Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety
Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J.
913, 940-66 (2004).
72. 514 U.S. 280 (1995).
73. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30 (2000).
74. See id.
75. See 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1).
112 [Vol. 54
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not exempt a person from liability at common law."76 The
Court observed that truck manufacturers had successfully
challenged the validity of federal motor vehicle safety
standard 121, which had imposed stopping distances for
trucks.77 As a result, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration had withdrawn the regulation and had not
replaced it.78 Since there was nothing to expressly preempt
the plaintiffs' tort claims, they were preserved by the Act's
savings clause. 79  Notwithstanding its rejection of
Cipollone's rule on implied preemption,80 the Court went on
to consider the defendants' implied preemption argument,
but ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs' design defect
claims did not conflict with federal regulatory objectives.81
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,8 2 the Court held that the
Medical Device Amendments8 3 to the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act 8 4 did not expressly preempt common law
claims based on a cardiac pacemaker lead's alleged defec-
tive design and inadequate labeling.86 The Medical Device
Amendments contained a preemption clause that prohibited
states from establishing "any requirement" that related to
the safety or effectiveness of a medical device if the
requirement was different from applicable federal
standards.8 6 The issue before the Court was whether state
tort liability rules might be "requirements" and, therefore,
preempted when they imposed a higher standard of care on
device manufacturers than the FDA. The Medtronic
pacemaker was a Class III medical device and, as such,
would normally have had to go though a rigorous pre-
market approval (PMA) process.8 7 However, because the
76. Id. § 30103(e).
77. See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 285-86.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 286.
80. See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 52, at 1463.
81. See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 289-90.
82. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000).
84. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-97 (2000).
85. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 502.
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
87. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477.
2006] 113
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defendant's pacemaker was "substantially equivalent" to
devices that had already been approved for marketing, it
was exempted from the PMA review and subjected to a
much less rigorous § 510(k) process.8 8
A four-justice plurality rejected the defendant's
contention that the term "requirement" in § 360k(a)
included all common law claims.8 9 The plurality then
considered whether § 360k(a) preempted the design defect
and failure-to-warn claims in this case. In doing so, the
plurality relied on the FDA's interpretation of § 360k(a)
which required that the FDA establish "specific counterpart
regulations or ... other specific requirements applicable to
a particular device" in order to preempt state law. 90
According to the plurality, the "substantial equivalent"
focus of § 510(k) was not specific to pacemakers, but was
applicable to any medical device. 91 The plurality also
declared that state law requirements would be preempted
only if they were specifically concerned with medical
devices. 92 The plurality then concluded that "general state
common law requirements" were not preempted because
they had not been specifically devvloped for medical
devices, but were entirely generic in nature. 93 Justice
Breyer concurred with the plurality's conclusion that the §
510(k) process was not device specific and, thus, provided
the fifth vote needed to reject the defendant's preemption
argument. 94 He disagreed, however, with the plurality's
conclusion that § 360k(a) could not preempt common law
tort doctrines. 95 The remaining four Justices rejected the
specific device limitation on preemption as it applied either
to FDA regulations or to state law.96
88. See id. The process is referred to as a "§ 510(k) process" because that
was the section number in the original act. Id.
89. See id. at 487.
90. Id. at 498 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995)).
91. See id. at 492-94.
92. See id. at 501.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 503-08 (Breyer, J. concurring).
95. Id. at 504-05.
96. Id. at 512-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 [Vol. 54
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In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,97 the Court held
that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS
208), which dealt with passive restraints in automobiles,
preempted design defect claims against automobile manu-
facturers who failed to equip their vehicles with airbags. 98
The Court observed that the National Transportation and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act contained both an express pre-
emption provision and a savings clause. 99 Reading these
two provisions in pari materia, the Court concluded that the
plaintiffs design defect claim was not expressly pre-
empted. 100 However, the Court went on to determine that
design defect claims based on an automaker's failure to
install airbags would conflict with DOT's regulatory objec-
tives, as embodied in FMVSS 208, which provided for a
gradual phase-in of airbags.'0o
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,10 2 the Court held that
the Boat Safety Act of 1971103 did not impliedly preempt the
plaintiffs common law design defect claim.'0 4 The plaintiff
argued that a boat engine manufactured by the defendant
was defective because it did not have a shroud or guard
around its propeller. 0 5 The Federal Boat Safety Act
authorized the Secretary of Transportation to establish
safety standards for recreational boats and equipment. 0 6
The federal Act contained an express preemption provision
which prohibited the states from establishing safety stan-
dards that were not identical to the federal standards. 0 7 It
also contained a savings clause. 108 The Court observed that
an advisory committee had studied the question of propeller
97. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
98. Id. at 865.
99. Id. at 868.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 875.
102. 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
103. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-11 (2003).
104. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69.
105. See id. at 55.
106. Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-75, § 2, 85 Stat. 213-14
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. 4301-11).
107. 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2003).
108. Id. § 4311(g).
2006] 115
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guards, but had declined to recommend that they be
required. 109 The Court interpreted the federal act's
preemption provision narrowly and concluded that it did
not expressly preempt state common law. 110 The Court also
rejected the argument that the boat safety act impliedly
preempted the plaintiffs tort claims."'
The most recent Supreme Court preemption case, Bates
v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,112 was decided in 2005. Bates
involved a suit by a group of Texas peanut farmers against
the manufacturer of "Strongarm," a weedkiller that was
registered by the EPA under the provisions of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).113 The
product's original label claimed that it could be used "in all
areas where peanuts are grown."" 4 Unfortunately, Stron-
garm was not suitable for use in soil which had a pH of 7.2
or more and the plaintiffs claimed that it had damaged
their peanut crops. 115 The plaintiffs based their claim
against the manufacturer on negligence and strict products
liability and also alleged fraud, breach of express warranty,
and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
Consumer Protection Act. 1 6 In response, the manufacturer,
Dow, contended that the plaintiffs' claims were expressly
and impliedly preempted by FIFRA." 7
As the Court observed, FIFRA contained an express
preemption clause, § 136v(b), which prohibited states from
imposing "any requirements for labeling or packaging in
addition to or different from" those required by FIFRA.118
The Court concluded, however, that the term "require-
ments," as used in this provision, did not preempt common
109. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 60-61.
110. Id. at 64.
111. Id. at 69-70.
112. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
113. Id. at 1792-93.
114. Id. at 1793.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000).
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law tort claims. 119 The Court acknowledged that a duty of
care imposed by state tort law could constitute a
requirement, but determined that it did not do so in this
case. 120 In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the
so-called "inducement test" that the Court of Appeals had
applied. 121 The lower court had concluded that the
imposition of tort liability amounted to a "requirement"
because it would induce the manufacturer to alter its
label. 122 Instead, the Court found that § 136v(b) permitted
the state to impose "parallel requirements" and different or
additional remedies than FIFRA.123 The Court also invoked
the presumption against preemption to support its narrow
interpretation of § 136v(b) 124 and also rejected the defen-
dant's contention that FIFRA imposed a high degree of
centralization and uniformity on pesticide labeling. 125
Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals to determine whether § 136v(b) preempted the
plaintiffs' fraud and failure to warn claims. 126
Although the Supreme Court's preemption jurispru-
dence is not particularly clear or consistent, 27 it is possible
to make a few observations based on the foregoing
overview. First, the Court tends to focus on express
preemption if the statute in question contains a preemption
provision, although it sometimes engages in an actual
conflict analysis under the guise of interpreting a statute's
preemptive language. 28 Second, the Court continues to
119. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1803.
120. Id. at 1798.
121. Id. at 1799-1800.
122. Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2003).
123. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1800-01.
124. Id. at 1801.
125. Id. at 1802.
126. Id. at 1803.
127. Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2085 (2000); see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000);
David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV.
411, 441 (2003).
128. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1797-1802 (2005);
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 348-59 (2000); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-99 (1996).
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invoke presumption against preemption, 129 although the
presumption's exact procedural effect remains uncertain. 130
In recent cases, the Court seems more willing to rely on
savings clauses to support a narrow view of the preemptive
scope of a statute. 131 Finally, the Court often gives consider-
able weight to an agency's position on preemption,
particularly if the agency has maintained this position
consistently. 132
C. The OSH Act and HazCom Standard Preemption
Provisions
Section 18(a) of the OSH Act declares that "[n]othing in
this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from
asserting jurisdiction under State law over any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no
standard is in effect under section 667 of [the Act].' 13 3 This
language permits the states to regulate occupational health
and safety in areas where OSHA has not promulgated
standards, but by implication also preempts state regula-
tion in areas where OSHA has promulgated standards. 134
In addition, the OSH Act contains a savings clause, §
4(b)(4) which states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or
statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees
129. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485; CSX Transp.,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 668 (1993).
130. Ausness, supra note 71, at 971-74.
131. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).
132. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 66-68; Geier, 529 U.S. at 868; Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 495; but see Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801-03; Norfolk, 529 U.S. at 356
(refusing to defer to change in interpretation by agency).
133. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)
(2001).
134. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992)
(declaring that "§ 18(a)'s preservation of state authority in the absence of a
federal standard presupposes a background pre-emption of all state
occupational safety and health standards whenever a federal standard
governing the same issue is in effect").
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under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
135
This provision clearly saves state workers' compensa-
tion laws from preemption and arguably does the same for
common law tort claims.
The HazCom Standard also contains preemptive
language. OSHA has declared that its HazCom Standard "is
intended to address comprehensively the issue of evaluat-
ing the potential hazards . . . and appropriate protective
measures to employees, and to preempt any legal
requirements of a state, or political subdivision of a state,
pertaining to this subject."'136 The Standard goes on to say
that "no state or political subdivision of a state may adopt
or enforce, through any court or agency, any requirement
relating to the issue addressed by this Federal standard,
except pursuant to a Federally-approved state plan."'137
III. PREEMPTION UNDER THE OSH ACT
A. OSH Act Preemption of State Legislation
1. Preemption Generally. In Five Migrant Farmworkers
v. Hoffman, 138 migrant farm workers sought to compel New
Jersey's Commissioner of Labor and Industry to conduct
preoccupancy inspections of migrant labor camps in the
state to ensure that minimum housing and sanitation
standards were being met. 3 9 OSHA had approved a state
plan submitted by New Jersey in 1972 which contained a
preoccupancy inspection requirement.1 40 However, OSHA's
approval was withdrawn when the state legislature failed
135. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4).
136. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (2006).
137. Id.
138. 45 A.2d 378 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1975).
139. Id. at 379.
140. Id. at 380.
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to enact legislation to implement the plan.' 4 ' The issue,
then, was whether OSHA inspection standards displaced
the state's requirements for the inspection of migrant labor
camps. The court found that OSHA had occupied the field,
declaring that the OSH Act was "so broad and sweeping as
to encompass the entire gamut of migrant worker
protection in the field of inspection and minimum standards
of migrant workers' housing quarters."'142 This field
preemption covered preoccupancy as well as post-occupancy
inspections. 143 Consequently, the plaintiffs could not compel
the state to continue its preoccupancy inspection pro-
gram. 144
In Puffer's Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan,145 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the OSH Act did not
impliedly preempt a Massachusetts statute that governed
elevator safety. 46 The plaintiff in that case was cited by
OSHA for violating the general duty provision of the OSH
Act after an employee was killed in an elevator accident. 47
The employer claimed that he was not liable because the
elevator complied with the applicable provisions of the
Massachusetts statute. 48 OSHA argued that OSH Act
preempted state law.149 The court observed that § 18(a) of
the OSH Act would not preempt state law unless OSHA
had promulgated a standard that related to the same area
and since OSHA had not done so, there was no preemp-
tion.150 Furthermore, the court did not find a conflict
between state law and federal law in this case because the
employer could simply comply with the more rigorous
regulatory standard.' 5'
141. Id.
142. Id. at 381.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 382.
145. 742 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 16-17.
147. Id. at 14.
148. Id. at 15-16.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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2. Preemption of State Criminal Law. Concerns about
lax federal enforcement of occupational safety and health
laws led some states in the 1980s to initiate criminal
prosecutions against employers who exposed their
employees to unsafe working conditions. 152 However,
defendants often argued that the OSH Act preempted state
criminal prosecutions in such cases. 153 For example, in P &
Z Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 54 the defendants, who
were convicted of failing to report employee injuries as
required by the D.C. Industrial Safety Act, 155 contended
that the D.C. statute was preempted by the OSH Act. 156
The court acknowledged that standards promulgated by
OSHA would preempt state law, but observed that
regulations would not. 57 According to the court, OSHA
implemented its reporting requirements under § 657(c) and
§ 673, not under its power to promulgate standards under §
655.158 The court concluded, therefore, that § 667 would not
preempt the reporting requirements of the D.C. statute
since there were no federal reporting requirements in place
that were embodied in a standard. 15
9
In People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp.,160 the state of
Illinois brought criminal charges against the defendant
corporation and five of its officers and agents for causing
injury to employees by knowingly and recklessly exposing
them to various toxic chemical substances. 16 1 The charges
included aggravated battery, reckless conduct, and conspir-
152. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 33.
153. P & Z Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 408 A.2d 1249 (D.C. 1979);
People v. Chi. Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.W.2d 962 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1989); People v.
Hegedus, 425 N.W.2d 729 (Mich. 1988); Sabine Consol., Inc., v. State, 756
S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1988); Wisconsin ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425 N.W.2d 21
(Wis. 1988).
154. 408 A.2d 1249 (D.C. 1979).
155. Id. at 1249-50.
156. Id. at 1250.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1251.
160. 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1989).
161. Id. at 963-64.
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acy to commit aggravated battery.162 The defendants
contended that the OSH Act preempted the state from
prosecuting them because OSHA standards established
permissible exposure limits for the toxic substances that
injured their employees and that OSHA regulated the
activities that allegedly created the unsafe workplace. 163
The lower court agreed with the defendants and ruled that
the OSH Act preempted the state from prosecuting them for
conduct that was already regulated by OSHA standards.
16 4
On appeal, however, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned
that the state's enforcement of generic criminal statutes did
not constitute an attempt to regulate occupational health
and safety. 165 The court observed that OSHA enforced its
regulations primarily through civil sanctions and concluded
that:
[w]hile additional sanctions imposed through State criminal law
enforcement for conduct also governed by OSHA safety standards
may incidentally serve as a regulation for workplace safety, there
is nothing in OSHA or its legislative history to indicate that
Congress intended to preempt the enforcement of State criminal
law simply because of its incidental regulatory effect. 1
66
However, several courts reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that the OSH Act did preempt state
criminal law provisions.167  For example, in Sabine
Consolidated, Inc. v. State, a Texas intermediate appellate
court reasoned that state prosecutions would "set up a body
of state law affecting workplace safety issues already
governed by federal standards .... ,,168 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, reversed, concluding that the
application of criminal laws to the workplace would not
162. Id. at 963.
163. Id. at 965.
164. Id. at 964.
165. Id. at 966.
166. Id. at 967.
167. See People v. Hegedus, 425 N.W.2d 729 (Mich. 1988); Sabine Consol.,
756 S.W.2d at 865.
168. 756 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App. 1988), rev'd, 806 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991).
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conflict with OSHA's goal of assuring safe and healthful
working conditions for employees. 169
In People v. Hegedus,170 an employee died from carbon
monoxide poisoning. 171 The accident occurred in a truck
owned by the victim's employer and the evidence showed
that, as a result of deterioration and poor maintenance,
carbon monoxide levels greatly exceeded OSHA stan-
dards. 172 The employee's supervisor was charged with
involuntary manslaughter. 173 When the trial court quashed
the information against the defendant, the state
appealed. 17 4 Although the defendant did not raise the
preemption issue on appeal, the intermediate appellate
court sua sponte determined that the OSH Act preempted
criminal prosecutions for conduct in the workplace that was
specifically regulated by the Act.' 75 As the court pointed
out, the state of Michigan regulated occupational health
and safety under a plan approved by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to § 667(b).176 The state statute provided for
criminal penalties for violation of carbon monoxide
standards (as did the OSH Act). 177 However, the state did
not prosecute the defendant for violating these standards;
rather, it prosecuted him under its generic manslaughter
statute. 7 8  The court declared that this attempt to
circumvent the penalties prescribed in the OSHA-approved
state plan constituted "an attempt to assert jurisdiction
over a federally covered occupational safety and health
issue other than through an approved state plan."' 79
169. 806 S.W.2d at 560.
170. 425 N.W.2d 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich.
1989).
171. Id. at 730.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 731.
175. Id. at 732.
176. Id. at 731.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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3. Preemption of State Licensing, Certification, and
Right-to-Know Laws. In the past, chemical manufacturers
and others have argued that the OSH Act and OSHA's
HazCom Standard preempt state right-to-know laws insofar
as they apply to the manufacturing sector. 8 0 For example,
in New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey,18 1 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that New Jersey's
right-to-know law was preempted by the HazCom Standard
insofar as it pertained to the protection of employee health
and safety in the manufacturing sector. The court refused,
however, to preempt provisions of the state law that
purported broader health and safety concerns.18 2 The
court's preemption analysis focused on whether the"primary purpose" of the state regulatory scheme was to
protect occupational safety and health or whether its
primary goal was the protection of the general public. 8 3
Another court took a similar approach in Manufacturers
Association of Tri-County v. Knepper,184 holding that the
HazCom standard preempted only those portions of the
Pennsylvania "right to know" statute that applied to
occupational health and safety in the manufacturing
sector. ' 8 5
Some courts have also upheld state certification and
licensing laws against claims of OSH Act preemption. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Environmental
Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York,' 86 ruled that the
OSH Act did not preempt New York City's asbestos
abatement regulations. 8 7 In 1986, the City enacted an
ordinance that required workers who might handle asbestos
at a construction or demolition site to obtain a certificate by
180. Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990); Mfrs.
Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986); Ohio Mfrs.' Ass'n v.
City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986); N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v.
Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985); United Steelworkers of Am., v. Auchter,
763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985).
181. 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).
182. See id. at 592.
183. See id. at 593; see also Hughey, 868 F.2d at 621.
184. 801 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986).
185. Id. at 134.
186. 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988).
187. Id. at 58.
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completing a four-day training course approved by the city
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and
passing a two-hour written exam.188 OSHA's Revised
Construction Standard also required training for asbestos
handlers but allowed employers to provide this training in
house and did not require that employees be certified. 8 9 A
group of asbestos abatement contractors brought suit,
contending that the OSH Act and its regulations preempted
the City's regulatory scheme. 190 The district court found
that the OSH Act neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted the City's program because the DEP program
was concerned with public health while the federal act was
concerned with occupational health and safety.191
The court first considered the plaintiffs' express
preemption claim. Observing that the Revised Construction
Standard had no express preemption clause, the court
turned its attention to § 18. Rejecting the approach adopted
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ohio
Manufacturers Association,192 the court concluded that the
OSH Act could preempt municipal ordinances as well as
state statutes. 193 In addition, the court acknowledged that
OSHA's Revised Construction Standard was a standard
within the meaning of § 18(a) and that the City had not
obtained OSHA approval of its DEP program pursuant to §
18(b).1 94 The only question, then, was whether the DEP
program constituted an "occupational safety or health
standard."' 95 The City argued that its program was
designed "to safeguard public health."'196 The court, how-
ever, agreed with the district court that the DEP program
188. Id. at 51.
189. Id. at 52.
190. Id. at 50.
191. Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 666 F. Supp. 535, 541-
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
192. Ohio Mfrs.' Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986).
193. Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d
Cir. 1988).
194. See id. at 55.
195. Id.
196. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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was intended to protect public health as well as employee
health and safety. 197
Thus, the court in Environmental Encapsulating
rejected the "primary purpose" approach employed by the
Third Circuit' 98 in favor of a dual purpose analysis. Under
this approach, if the City could show that there was a
"legitimate and substantial purpose" for a DEP requirement
apart from the protection of asbestos workers, the
requirement would not be considered a state occupational
safety and health requirement and, therefore, would not be
preempted by § 18.199 Applying this test, the court
concluded that, with the exception of two provisions that
were solely concerned with asbestos workers, the DEP
training requirements were intended to protect the health
of members of the general public and not just asbestos
workers. 200 Turning to the issue of implied preemption, the
court observed that the presumption against preemption
applied and that the burden of overcoming this
presumption was especially heavy "in those cases that rely
on implied preemption, which rests in turn on inference.
'201
With that in mind, the court found that the Revised
Construction Standard was not so comprehensive as to
indicate that OSHA intended to occupy the field of worker
education in asbestos abatement education. 20 2 The court
also rejected the plaintiffs' actual conflict argument. There
was no evidence that OSHA intended for employers to be
the exclusive educators of their employees, so the City's
requirement for third-party training programs did not
conflict with OSHA's regulation. 203 Furthermore, the court
found no indication that the OSH Act required uniform
training programs. 20 4 Therefore, the court determined that
197. Id. at 56.
198. See, e.g., Mfrs' Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130, 137 (3d
Cir. 1986); N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1985); N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, 653 F. Supp. 1453, 1465
(D.N.J. 1987).
199. Envtl. Encapsulating, 855 F.2d at 57.
200. Id. at 57-58.
201. Id. at 58.
202. Id. at 58-59.
203. Id. at 59.
204. Id.
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the OSH Act did not impliedly preempt the City's DEP
regulations.20
5
Shortly thereafter, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ohio Manufacturers' Association v. City of Akron 20 6 held
that municipal right-to-know ordinances could also be
preempted by the HazCom Standard. In 1984, the City of
Akron, Ohio adopted an ordinance that required employers
to provide information to various municipal agencies about
any hazardous chemicals manufactured, used, or stored
inside the workplace, as well as any hazardous chemicals
that were discharged from the workplace or stored as
chemical waste. 20 7 The ordinance also required employers to
inform employees about hazardous chemicals, to label such
materials, to provide training, to keep records, and to file
reports about hazardous materials to city officials. 208
The Association argued that the local ordinance was
preempted by the OSH Act and the HazCom Standard. 209
Reviewing the text of the OSH Act and its legislative
history, the court could find no evidence of an intent to
preempt local law. 210 However, the court also examined the
HazCom standard itself and the preamble to the HazCom
standard published in the Federal Register.211 In that
preamble, OSHA declared that its proposed standard was
in response to the regulatory burden imposed on businesses
by the proliferation of state and local right-to-know laws. 212
Although uniformity was not one of the OSH Act's express
goals, the court determined that "OSHA could legitimately
determine that uniformity would aid in the administration
and enforcement of, and compliance with, its standard."213
205. Id.
206. 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986).
207. Id. at 825.
208. Id. at 825-26.
209. Id. at 825.
210. Id. at 830. Subsequently, OSHA made it clear that § 18 applied to all
"state or local laws which relate to an issue covered by a [f]ederal standard." 52
Fed. Reg. 31,860 (1987).
211. Id. at 832.
212. See Hazard Communication, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,283-84 (Nov. 25, 1983) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
213. Ohio Mfrs.'Ass'n, 801 F.2d at 834.
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Consequently, the court concluded that the HazCom
Standard preempted Akron's right-to-know ordinance, at
least as far as it applied to workplace safety.
214
The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a similar
Massachusetts statute in Associated Industries of
Massachusetts v. Snow.215 Various OSHA standards, includ-
ing the HazCom Standard, provided for the protection of
workers in the asbestos abatement industry. 216 In 1987, the
Massachusetts Department of Labor promulgated even
more stringent standards. 21 7 Associated Industries of
Massachusetts (AIM) challenged these state standards,
claiming that they were preempted by OSHA's regula-
tions.218 The district court, following the Second Circuit's
approach in Environmental Encapsulating Corp. v. City of
New York, 219 upheld the Massachusetts statute and all but
one of its regulations. 220 On appeal, the court considered
both express and implied preemption claims.
Rejecting both the primary purpose and the dual
purpose tests, the court declared that it would "examine the
effect that the Massachusetts standards have on their two
stated purposes, the protection of 'the general public and
the occupational health and safety of workers."' 221 If the
Massachusetts statute's effect was to protect the public, it
would not be preempted by the OSH Act; however, if the
statute's effect was solely to protect workers, it would be
preempted.222 Finally, if the effect of the statute was to
protect the public by regulating some aspects of workplace
safety, it would still be upheld since its ultimate effect was
to protect the general public.223 Applying this methodology,
the court found that § 18 of the OSH Act did not preempt
214. Id.
215. 898 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1990).
216. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (2006); Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200 (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.59 (2006).
217. See 898 F.2d at 277.
218. Id. at 276.
219. 855 F.2d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 1988).
220. Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow, 717 F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass. 1989).
221. Associated Indus., 898 F.2d at 279-80.
222. Id. at 280.
223. Id.
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Massachusetts' training, licensing, or certification require-
ments.224 The court also upheld the statute's work practice
requirements because their effect was to protect the public
from exposure to asbestos. 225 In addition, the court declared
that the OSH Act did not preempt a state regulation that
required asbestos abatement workers to wear disposable
protective clothing.226 Finally, the court concluded that
OSHA's HazCom Standard did not preempt the Massachu-
setts statute except for state training programs aimed
primarily at employee safety.
227
The court also rejected AIM's contention that the OSH
Act and its standards impliedly preempted the Massachu-
setts statute. 228 The court found no evidence that OSHA
had "occupied the occupational safety and health fields of
asbestos and hazard communications. '229 Moreover, the
court did not agree that the Massachusetts statute upset
some sort of "balance" struck by Congress between worker
safety and economic concerns. Rather, the court declared
that "[t]he main thrust of the OSH Act and OSHA
regulations is protecting the safety and health of the
nation's workers."230 Finally, the court rejected the claim
that the OSH Act intended to provide for the establishment
of uniform occupational safety and health standards
throughout the country.
231
B. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association
The United States Supreme Court finally resolved the
conflict of authority, discussed above, in Gade v. National
Solid Wastes Management Association.232 In 1988, the state
of Illinois enacted two statutes that required hazardous
waste equipment operators and workers to obtain
224. Id.
225. Id. at 281.
226. See id. at 281.
227. Id. at 282.
228. Id. at 283.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 282-83.
231. Id. at 283.
232. 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
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licenses. 233 The training requirements necessary to obtain a
state license were more rigorous and burdensome than the
training requirements that operators and workers were
obliged to meet under OSHA regulations. 234 Consequently,
the National Solid Wastes Management Association
(Association), a trade association of businesses that remove,
transport, and dispose of waste material, including hazard-
ous wastes, sought to enjoin state officials from enforcing
the Illinois licensing acts on the grounds that they were
preempted by the OSH Act and applicable OSHA
regulations. 235 Finding that the licensing acts had a
"legitimate and substantial purpose apart from promoting
job safety," the district court rejected the Association's
preemption claim. 236 The Court of Appeals held that the
OSH Act would preempt any state law that constituted "in
a direct, clear and substantial way, regulation of worker
health and safety"237 and remanded the case back to the
district court to determine which, if any, of the licensing
acts' provisions might be preempted. 23 8
Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, wrote
the plurality opinion which concluded that the OSH Act
impliedly preempted the Illinois licensing statutes. 239
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but argued that
the Illinois statutes were expressly preempted by § 18(b). 240
Looking at the overall design and structure of the OSH Act,
the Court declared that "Congress intended to subject
employers and employees to only one set of regulations, be
it federal or state, and that the only way a State may
regulate an OSHA-regulated occupational safety and health
issue is pursuant to an approved state plan that displaces
the federal standards."241 The Court relied primarily on §
233. See id. at 93.
234. See id. at 93-94.
235. Id. at 94.
236. Id.
237. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d 671, 679 (7th Cir.
1990).
238. See id. at 684.
239. Gade, 505 U.S. at 98-99.
240. Id. at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 99.
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18(b) to support its conclusion that the states could not
displace OSHA standards without an approved plan.
242
According to the Court, the states could not merely
supplement existing federal standards; their only choice
was to displace federal standards completely by means of
an OSHA-approved plan or to refrain from regulating in an
area that was already subject to OSHA standards.
243
Furthermore, the Court declared that this view was
also supported by other parts of § 18.244 For example, the
Court found that "§ 18(a)'s preservation of state authority
in the absence of a federal standard presupposes a
background pre-emption of all state occupational safety and
health standards whenever a federal standard governing
the same issue is in effect. ' 245 The Court also looked to §
18(c), which provided that standards in state plans that
affected interstate commerce would only be approved if they
were "required by compelling local conditions" and would
not "unduly burden interstate commerce." 246 According to
the Court, "[i]t would make little sense to impose such
conditions on state programs intended to supplant federal
regulation and not those that merely supplement it" when
the burden on interstate commerce might be just as
great.247 In addition, the Court observed that § 18(f), which
permitted the Secretary of Labor to withdraw approval of a
state plan, indicated that a state would lose the power to
enforce any occupational safety and health regulations in
areas covered by federal standards once approval for the
state plan was withdrawn. 248 Finally, the Court noted that
§ 18(h), which allowed the Secretary to keep state laws in
force during the § 18(b) approval process, also presupposed
that federal jurisdiction was exclusive when a federal
standard was in effect. 249
242. See id.
243. Id. at 99-100.
244. See id. at 100.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 101.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 101-02.
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Having concluded that the OSH Act would not permit
the states to supplement OSHA standards, the Court then
considered whether the Act also preempted "dual purpose"
laws that purported to protect members of the general
public as well as workers. The Court stated that it could,
pointing out that "[o]ur precedents leave no doubt that a
dual impact state regulation cannot avoid OSH Act
preemption simply because the regulation serves several
objectives rather than one. ' 250 Instead, the Court declared,
the Act would preempt any state regulation that "consti-
tutes, in a direct, clear and substantial way, regulation of
worker health and safety. '251 Thus, a state law directed at
workplace safety would not be saved from preemption
simply because it had some additional effect outside of the
workplace. 25
2
Finally, the Court distinguished between dual purpose
regulations and "state laws of general applicability," such
as traffic or fire safety laws, which regulated workers and
nonworkers alike. 253 Even though such laws might have
some "direct and substantial" effect on worker safety, they
could not be considered occupational standards because
they regulate workers, not as workers, but as general
members of the public. 254
C. Preemption of Common Law Tort Claims by the OSH Act
1. Preemption Generally. The preemptive effect of the
OSH Act on tort claims has been considered by several
courts both before and after the Gade decision. With one
exception, these courts have concluded that the OSH Act
does not preempt state tort law. This issue first arose in
Berardi v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co. 255 In Berardi,
the plaintiff, who had been hired to work on two water
towers located on the roof of a building owned by one of the
defendants, was injured when he fell from one of the
250. Id. at 106.
251. Id. at 107.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 435 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
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towers. 256 The plaintiff sued the owner of the building,
alleging that it had failed to provide proper safety
equipment as required by state law. 257 The owner then
impleaded the plaintiff's employer as a third party
defendant. 258 The owner moved to dismiss on the basis that
the plaintiffs tort claim was preempted by the OSH Act.259
The court noted that the Act had a broad preemptive effect
as far as the employer-employee relationship was con-
cerned, but once outside this sphere, "the hold of the Act
over state action is relatively weak and diminished. '260
Furthermore, the court observed, state law regulated areas
not covered by the OSH Act and utilized different enforce-
ment tools to achieve its objectives. 261 Consequently, the
court concluded that the OSH Act did not preempt the
plaintiff's claim.262
A decade later, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the same issue in Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co. 26 3 In
that case, the plaintiff brought suit against Shell Oil
Company, the manufacturer of Epichlorohydrin (ECH), a
toxic chemical. 264 According to the plaintiff, exposure to
ECH in the workplace caused him to develop acute asthma
symptoms. 265 However, the district court found that
because OSHA regulated workplace exposure to ECH and
required employers to provide protective equipment to
employees who worked with this material, the imposition of
duties upon Shell based on tort law amounted to a form of
state occupational health and safety regulation that was
not permitted by the OSH Act. 266 The district court's
decision was reversed by the federal appeals court.267 The
256. Id. at 214.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 216.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 219.
263. 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1991).
264. Id. at 49.
265. Id. at 50.
266. See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 729 F. Supp. 187, 188-89 (D. Mass. 1990).
267. Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 54.
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Pedraza court acknowledged that § 18(a) prohibited a state
from promulgating any occupational safety or health
standard relating to any issue that was already covered by
a federal standard unless it first submitted a plan to OSHA
for approval under § 18(b). 26 8 However, the court then
distinguished between positive standards and regulations
that might conflict with existing OSHA standards and the
establishment of "a neutral forum for the orderly
adjustment of private disputes between, among others, the
users and suppliers of toxic substances. ' 26 9 The court went
on to declare that this interpretation was reinforced by the
OSH Act's savings clause, § 4(b)(4), which declared that the
Act should not be construed to "diminish or affect in any
other manner the common law . . . rights" of employees. 270
The court observed that there was a "solid consensus" that §
4(b)(4) operated to save state tort rules from preemption. 271
A Massachusetts appeals court also refused to preempt
a common law tort claim in Jones v. Cincinnati, Inc. 272 The
plaintiff, who was injured by a press brake, brought an
action against the manufacturer of the machine for
negligent design and breach of warranty.2 7 3 The machine
was sold to the plaintiffs employer without any safety
devices to protect the operator from injury.274 The
manufacturer pointed out that an OSHA regulation
provided that "[t]he point of operation of machines whose
operation exposes an employee to injury shall be guarded"
by the employer. 275 The court observed that the OSH Act's
savings clause stated that it did not intend to enlarge or
diminish the common law rights of employers or
employees. 276 Furthermore, if tort claims were preempted,
this would permit "manufacturers who negligently design
or sell defective and dangerous machines to be free from all
268. Id. at 52.
269. Id. at 53.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 589 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. Ct. App. 1992).
273. Id. at 336.
274. Id. at 337.
275. Id. at 338 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(3) (2003)).
276. Id. at 339-40.
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liability," a result that would be contrary to the state's
public policy.277
A more recent case, Dukes v. Sirius Construction,
Inc.,278 involved a negligence claim against the City of
Missoula for failing to properly inspect scaffolding at a
construction site as required by the state's scaffolding
act.279 In response, the City contended that the OSH Act
and OSHA standards preempted the state law; if the
scaffolding law was invalid, the City could not be held liable
for failing to comply with its requirements. 28 0 On appeal,
the Montana Supreme Court invoked the presumption
against preemption 28' and determined that § 4(b)(4) of the
OSH Act did not clearly and manifestly preempt the
plaintiffs' tort claim. 28 2 Relying on the language of § 18(a),
the court also rejected the City's claim that the OSH Act
occupied the entire field of occupational safety and
health. 28 3 Finally, the court refused to find that there was
an actual conflict between the OSH Act and the state
statute.284 The court observed that the state scaffolding act
did not have substantive standards that were different than
OSHA's; rather the state statute merely authorized the
state to enforce OSHA's scaffolding standards. 28 5 According
to the court, the imposition of a duty to inspect on the City
to ensure that contractors complied with OSHA standards
would not subject them to "duplicative or supplemental
occupational safety or health standards" and, therefore,
would not create an obstacle to the achievement of the OSH
Act's regulatory objectives. 286  Consequently, the court
concluded that the federal statute did not expressly or
impliedly preempt state law.
277. Id. at 340.
278. 73 P.3d 781 (Mont. 2003).
279. Id. at 783.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 785.
282. Id. at 786.
283. Id. at 788-93.
284. Id. at 793.
285. Id. at 793-94.
286. Id. at 794.
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The only exception to this "no-preemption" consensus is
Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Importing Co.,287 decided by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in 2005. The plaintiff in that case,
who was struck by a forklift operated by another employee,
brought suit against the manufacturer, claiming it should
have installed additional warning devices on the
machine. 28 8 OSHA had adopted several ANSI standards:
one required forklifts to be equipped with an operator
controlled horn, while another provided that additional
warning devices could be installed when requested by the
user, that is, the purchaser.289 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the
OSH Act preempted the plaintiffs tort claim. 290 This
decision was affirmed by a New Jersey intermediate
appellate court.291 On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme
Court first determined that the OSH Act did not expressly
preempt common law tort claims. 2 92 Relying on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Geier, the court determined
that the OSH Act's savings clause, section 4(b)(4),
mandated that the Act's preemption clause, section 18(a),
should be read narrowly. 293 The court also rejected the
defendant's field preemption argument. 294 According to the
court, sections 18(a) and 18(b) demonstrated that Congress
did not intend to occupy the field of occupational health and
safety, but instead wanted the states to play an important
role in this area. 295
The court then considered the issue of conflict
preemption and applied the Supreme Court's approach in
Geier296 In Geier, FMVSS 208 mandated that automobile
manufacturers be allowed to choose among various passive
287. 877 A.2d 1247 (N.J. 2005).
288. Id. at 1249.
289. Id. at 1252.
290. Id. at 1249.
291. Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile Imp. Co., 853 A.2d 298 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004).
292. Gonzalez, 877 A.2d at 1250.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1251.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1252.
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restraints; hence, a standard imposed upon manufacturers
by state tort law would conflict with congressional intent if
it required them to install airbags in their vehicles in order
to avoid tort liability.297 In Gonzalez, the court concluded
that the OSHA standards were not minimum standards,
but regulated the "universe of warning devices." 298 OSHA's
decision to give the forklift operators discretion to choose
what warning devices to install (other than operator
controlled horns) reflected its concern that some warning
devices might create more dangers than they prevented and
that operators, rather than third parties, were in the best
position to make a judgment about these safety-related
tradeoffs. 299 As in Geier, a common law tort standard that
required manufacturers to install other warning devices
would strip them of this discretion and, therefore, would
conflict with OSHA's policy. 300 The court held, therefore,
that the plaintiffs tort claim was impliedly preempted. 301
2. Preemption of Common Law Tort Claims by the
HazCom Standard. The only case prior to Gade to consider
the preemptive effect of the HazCom Standard on common
law tort claims was York v. Union Carbide Corp.30 2 In York,
an Indiana intermediate appellate court concluded that tort
claims were not preempted. 30 3 In that case, the widow of a
steelworker who was asphyxiated by argon gas brought a
products liability suit against the gas supplier, alleging that
it failed to provide an adequate warning. 30 4 The gas
supplier argued that the plaintiffs claim was preempted by
the OSH Act and the HazCom standard. 30 5 Relying on the
reasoning of Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 306 the court held that
297. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000).
298. Gonzalez, 877 A.2d at 1253.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 586 N.E.2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
303. Id. at 866.
304. Id. at 862-63.
305. Id. at 864-65.
306. 942 F.2d 48 (lst Cir. 1991).
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the OSH Act's savings clause operated to exempt tort
claims from preemption.
30 7
Since Gade, several cases have considered the
preemptive effect of the HazCom Standard on state statutes
and tort law. For example, in Industrial Truck Association,
v. Henry,308 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the OSH Act's HazCom Standard preempted certain
provisions of California's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act, 30 9 also known as Proposition 65.310 This
provision required employers to warn workers who might be
exposed to chemicals that were known to cause cancer,
birth defects, or other reproductive harm. 311 Although
California's original state plan had been approved by
OSHA, some of the provisions mandated by Proposition 65
did not receive OSHA approval. 312 A trade association of
forklift manufacturers challenged the California law,
arguing that it was preempted by the OSH Act and the
HazCom Standard. 313 The district court dismissed the
lawsuit, 314 but the decision was reversed on appeal. The
appeals court determined that Gade stood for the
proposition that "the preemption worked by federal OSHA
standards goes beyond conflict preemption" and "that
principles of field preemption apply against any state law
relating to the 'issue' or subject matter of a federal
standard."3 15 The court also declared that this field
preemption rationale applied whether or not an approved
state plan was in effect.316 Therefore, even though
California had an approved state plan, those portions of
Proposition 65 that were not part of the state plan would be
307. York, 586 N.E.2d at 866.
308. 125 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1997).
309. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1999).
310. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1306.
311. Id. at 1307.
312. See id. at 1308.
313. Id.
314. Indus. Truck Ass'n v. Henry, 909 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
315. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1310.
316. See id. at 1311.
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preempted with respect to safety issues already addressed
by a federal standard.31
7
The court then considered whether Proposition 65's
warning requirements addressed an "issue" that was
already covered by the HazCom Standard. For guidance,
the court looked to OSHA's interpretation of the term
"issue" in the HazCom regulation. 318 The regulation
declared that the HazCom Standard was intended "to
address comprehensively the issue of evaluating the
potential hazards of chemicals, and communicating
information concerning hazards and appropriate protective
measures to employees .... -319 The court concluded that
this language was broad enough to overlap with the state
law requirements. 320 The court also quoted from OSHA's
commentary in the 1987 preamble to the HazCom Standard
which declared:
[A]ny State or local government provisions requiring the
preparation of material safety data sheets, labeling of chemicals
and identification of their hazards, development of written hazard
communication programs including lists of hazardous chemicals
present in the workplace, and development and implementation of
worker chemical hazard training for the primary purpose of
assuring worker safety and health, would be preempted by the
HCS unless it was established under the authority of an OSHA-
approved State plan.
32 1
Therefore, the court held that those requirements in
Proposition 65 that were not part of an approved state plan
were preempted. 322
On the other hand, in Wickham v. American Tokyo
Kasei, Inc.,323 a federal district court held that the HazCom
Standard does not preempt common law tort claims. In that
case, a worker brought suit against a chemical
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis
added).
320. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1312.
321. Hazard Communication, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,852, 31,861 (1987).
322. Henry, 125 F.3d at 1314-15.
323. 927 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Il. 1996).
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manufacturer for injuries he suffered when a container
containing DMVAD exploded. 324 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant, in violation of the HazCom Standard, failed to
warn about the chemical's explosiveness, either through
labeling, material safety data sheets, or catalog listings. 325
The defendant argued that the OSH Act and the HazCom
Standard expressly preempted the plaintiffs claim. 326
Relying on the Pedraza case, the court concluded that the
OSH Act's savings clause, § 4(b)(4), protected state tort law
from preemption. 327 The court also rejected the defendant's
argument that all of the plaintiffs remedies for violation of
the OSH Act were limited to those that were expressly
provided for in the Act. 328 The court pointed out, however,
that since the OSH Act was purely regulatory and did not
provide any private remedies, preempting common law tort
actions would deprive injured workers of any recourse
against manufacturers who violated OSHA standards.3 29
The court declared that "[i]t is obvious ... that Congress, in
enacting a statute designed specifically to protect
employees and others from such potential hazards, did not
intend such a result."
IV. THE WELDING FUME PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
The Welding Fume litigation involved lawsuits by
welders and other workers against manufacturers,
suppliers, and distributors of welding rod products and
their trade associations.3 3 0 The plaintiffs alleged they
suffered neurological injuries as a result of inhaling
manganese in the fumes given off during the welding
process. 331 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants failed
324. Id. at 293.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 294.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 295.
329. Id.
330. In re Welding Fume Products Liability Litigation, 364 F. Supp. 2d 669
(N.D. Ohio 2005).
331. Id. at 673.
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to warn about these dangers. 332 These cases were
consolidated under the Multi-District Litigation statute for
a pretrial proceeding. 333 The defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs' common law tort claims
were preempted by the OSH Act and the HazCom
Standard.334 However, after reviewing the OSH Act and the
HazCom Standard, a federal district judge concluded that
neither the statute nor the OSHA regulation preempted the
plaintiffs' claims. 335
A. The Welding Fume Court's Preemption Methodology.
The court began its preemption analysis by laying down
some interpretive rules. Citing Medtronic and Cipollone,
the court observed that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case. '336 While
this intent is normally derived from the text of the statute
in question, the court, quoting from Medtronic, declared
that it may also be revealed by the "structure and purpose
of the statute as a whole," as well as by a "reasoned
understanding of the way in which Congress intended the
statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect
business, consumers, and the law."337
1. The Presumption Against Preemption. The court
declared that a presumption against preemption applied to
federal statutes that purported to limit the states' "historic
police powers."338 Furthermore, this presumption not only
applied to the threshold question of whether Congress
intended to preempt state law at all, but also limited the
scope of any preemption that Congress did intend.3 39 The
presumption against preemption was reinforced by the
existence a savings clause in the OSH Act. According to the
court, the doctrine of federal preemption should be applied
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 682.
336. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
337. Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486).
338. Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
339. Id. at 682-83.
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narrowly in this case because the savings clause indicated
that Congress did not intend to preempt state law
completely. 340 Finally, the court noted that when a preemp-
tion claim is based on agency regulations, it must examine
these regulations carefully to determine exactly what they
require and it should find preemption only when state law
"directly conflicts with the federal regulations. ' 341 This
dictated that the HazCom Standard's preemptive language
be narrowly construed.
2. The OSH Act's Savings Clause. The OSH Act's
savings clause, § 4(b)(4), played a critical role in the
Welding Fume court's preemption analysis. Relying on the
Supreme Court's statements in Sprietsma and Geier, the
court declared that the presence of a savings clause like §
4(b)(4) supported a narrow interpretation of the OSH Act's
preemptive language. 342 Furthermore, the court observed,
"no other enactment contains a savings clause more
broad."343 The savings clause not only declared that the
OSH Act would "neither 'enlarge [n]or diminish' the
common law," but it would also not "affect [the common
law] in any other manner. ' 344 In the court's view, "[i]t is
difficult to imagine a more explicit statement of Congres-
sional intention to preserve and not pre-empt state common
law."345 This clear statement of congressional intent,
coupled with the presumption against preemption, led the
court to conclude that nothing in the OSH Act expressly
preempted common law tort claims. 346
The court acknowledged that a savings clause would
not necessarily prevent the OSH Act from impliedly
preempting state tort law. 347 However, it concluded that the
existence of such a provision mandated that the court
should define the scope of any implied preemption as
340. Id. at 683.
341. Id. at 684.
342. Id. at 683.
343. Id. at 687.
344. Id. at 688.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 683.
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narrowly as possible. 348 This meant that the court should
not "hunt for a conflict" between state and federal law.
349
The court then concluded that Congress intended to
preempt state tort law, if at all, only "to the narrowest
degree possible. ' 350 The court observed that the savings
clause was at least as broad and certainly more sweeping
than the statutory language which gave the Secretary of
Labor the authority to promulgate health and safety stan-
dards. 351 Therefore, the HazCom Standard would preempt
state tort law only when there was a clear, unavoidable
conflict between them.
352
The court's treatment of the OSH Act's savings clause is
consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Geier and
Sprietsma353 and other preemption cases. 354 In effect, a
savings clause is an instruction from Congress to interpret
the language of the statute's preemption clause narrowly.
355
Moreover, the savings clause is not limited to express
preemption analysis, but might also be relevant to the
implied preemption issue. This not only affects the scope of
field preemption by narrowing any field that might be
occupied by federal law, but it also affects conflict
preemption analysis by foreclosing any "hunt for a conflict"
by the court.356
3. Implied Preemption. The court found that the OSH
Act did not expressly preempt the plaintiffs' common law
tort claims. 357 The court identified § 18(a) and § 18(b) as the
textual sources of express preemption. 358 Read together,
348. Id. at 688.
349. Id. at 688-89.
350. Id. at 691.
351. Id. at 691.
352. Id. at 692.
353. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).
354. See, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1991); Jones
v. Cincinnati, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 335, 339-40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Gonzalez v.
Ideal Tile Importing Co., 877 A.2d 1247, 1250 (N.J. 2005).
355. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
356. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 688-89.
357. Id. at 682.
328. See id. at 674.
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these two provisions delineated the OSH Act's preemptive
scope: "the states can set standards in areas where OSHA
has not, but cannot set standards in areas where OSHA
has" unless it does so as part of a state plan approved under
the provisions of § 18(b). 359 However, the court then
interpreted the term "standard" to exclude tort law. 360 The
Welding Fume court was not alone in reaching this
conclusion. The Supreme Court held in Gade that the OSH
Act did not expressly preempt a state statute; and the
Court's reasoning in that case seems applicable to tort law
as well. Furthermore, a number of other courts have also
concluded that the OSH Act does not expressly preempt tort
claims. 361
The court concluded that the HazCom Standard did not
expressly preempt the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims
either. 362 The court examined the HazCom's preemption
provision, which expressly preempted "any legal
requirements" that purported to evaluate "the potential
hazards of chemicals, and communicating information
concerning hazards and appropriate protective measures to
employees. '363 However, the court declared that this
language applied only to workplace-specific regulations
directed at employers and did not extend to the broader
duty to warn under state tort law that applied to
manufacturers and others. 36
4
4. Deference to Agency Interpretations. The HazCom
Standard declared that it would preempt any "legal
requirements" pertaining to "evaluating the potential
hazards of chemicals" as well as "communicating
information concerning hazards and appropriate protective
359. Id.
360. See id. at 689-90.
361. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1991); Wickham v. Am.
Tokyo Kasei, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1996); York v. Union Carbide
Corp., 586 N.E.2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. Cincinnati, Inc., 589 N.E.2d
335 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Dukes v. Sirius Constr., Inc., 73 P.3d 781 (Mont.
2003); Gonzales v. Ideal Tile Imp. Co., 877 A.2d 1247 (N.J. 2005); Berardi v.
Getty Refining & Mktg. Co., 435 N.Y.S.2d 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
362. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
363. Id. at 690-91.
364. Id. at 693-94.
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measures to employees."365 This language suggested that
the HazCom standard would preempt the common law duty
to warn as far as warnings directed at employees were
concerned. However, the Welding Fume court largely
disregarded OSHA's interpretation. Instead, it found that
the OSH Act's savings clause defined the scope of OSHA's
power to preempt state tort law and that OSHA could not
disregard congressional intent. 366 This strategy enabled the
court to avoid the Supreme Court's dictate in Chevron Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,367 which re-
quired courts to defer to agency interpretations.
Chevron Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.368 teaches us that a court should not impose its own
construction on the statute when a statute is silent or
ambiguous about a specific issue, but should determine
whether the agency's position is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. According to Chevron, if the
agency's interpretation is permissible, the court must defer
to the agency, even if the court would have reached a
different interpretation on its own. 369 One could argue that
the Welding Fume court should have applied the Chevron
rule and deferred to OSHA's interpretation of its power to
preempt common law tort doctrines under the OSH Act. On
the other hand, Chevron did not involve administrative
preemption and some commentators believe that Chevron
does not require courts to allow agencies to define the scope
of their own powers. 370 The court in Welding Fume
obviously agreed with that view.
B. Substantive Preemption Issues
In its opinion, the Welding Fume court addressed a
number of preemption issues. One was whether the OSH
Act preempted state tort law to the same extent that it
365. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 690 (quoting Hazard
Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (2003)).
366. Id. at 691-92.
367. Chevron Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
368. Id.
369. Id. at 842-43.
370. John J. Manna, Jr., Note, The Extent of OSHA Preemption of State
Hazard Reporting Requirements, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 630, 638 (1988).
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preempted statutes or regulations. In addition, there were
several issues more closely associated with the HazCom
Standard. First, what sort of limits did the Act place on
OSHA's power to expressly preempt state tort law when it
promulgated the HazCom Standard? Second, did the
HazCom Standard address the same "subject matter" as
state tort law? Finally, did the HazCom Standard impliedly
preempt state tort law on actual conflict grounds?
1. Tort Law Versus Positive Regulation. The court in
Welding Fume distinguished Gade because that case
involved positive regulations rather than principles of tort
law. 371 In Gade, the Court held that a state could not
enforce an "occupational safety and health standard" of its
own when an OSHA standard covered the same subject
matter unless its standard was part of an approved state
plan.372 On the other hand, the Gade Court declared that
the OSH Act would ordinarily not preempt "state laws of
general applicability" as long as they did not directly
conflict with an OSHA standard. 373 To avoid preemption,
therefore, a tort-based duty to warn would have to be a law
of general applicability and not a particularized occupa-
tional standard.
The court relied on the federal appeals court's
reasoning in Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co. 374 to conclude that the
duty to warn was a law of general applicability.3 7 5 The
Pedraza court had declared that common law torts did not
constitute an "arrogation of regulatory jurisdiction over an
occupational safety or health issue," but rather was more of
''a neutral forum for the orderly adjustment of private
disputes between, among others, the users and suppliers of
toxic substances."376 According to the Pedraza court, this
distinction between tort law and positive regulation was
further strengthened by the OSH Act's savings clause. 377
This provision expressly stated that the OSH Act "was not
371. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 685-87.
372. Gade, 505 U.S. at 99.
373. Id. at 107.
374. 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1991).
375. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
376. Pedraza, 942 F.2d at 53.
377. Id. at 54.
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intended to pre-empt state tort law even though tort
liability might operate to regulate workplace conduct and
implicitly set safety standards.
'378
The Welding Fume court also considered whether
principles of state tort law could be regarded as"occupational standards" for purposes of sections 18(a) and
18(b). The court observed that the OSH Act defined an
occupational safety and health standard as one which"requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more
practices, means, methods, operations, or processes,
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment and places of employment. ' 379 The
court reasoned that this language contemplated something
in the nature of "[workplace] -specific enactments of positive
law by legislative or administrative bodies" rather than ex
post application of broad legal standards to a particular set
of facts by a judge or jury.380 Furthermore, the court
declared, it made no sense to apply § 18(b) to common law
tort principles. While a state could incorporate positive
regulations into its plan for submission to the Secretary of
Labor under § 18(b), it could hardly do so with common law
tort principles.38 1 This suggested to the court that sections
18(a) and 18(b) were not intended to apply to state tort
law. 382 Apparently believing that there was safety in
numbers, the court also pointed out that many other courts
had reached the same conclusion. 38 3
2. Preemption by the HazCom Standard. The court also
considered whether OSHA had administratively preempted
state tort law when it promulgated the HazCom Standard.
The court concluded that the HazCom Standard did not
378. Id.
379. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 652(8)
(2001).
380. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 689.
381. Id. at 690.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 686-87 (citing Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir.
1991); Fullen v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 2d 471 (N.D. W. Va.
2002); Wickham v. Am. Tokyo Kasei, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
York v. Union Carbide Corp., 586 N.E.2d 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Jones v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 595 N.E.2d
326 (Mass. 1992); Dukes v. Sirius Constr., Inc., 73 P.3d 781 (Mont. 2003).
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preempt state law because: (1) Congress did not authorize
OSHA to preempt state tort law unless it created a clear
and unavoidable conflict with OSHA standards; (2) the
HazCom Standard's subject matter was limited to protect-
ing employees, while the duty to warn under state tort law
was much broader; and (3) since the HazCom Standard did
not mandate any specific warning, it was possible for a
manufacturer to comply with both legal obligations and,
hence, there was no conflict between the HazCom Standard
and the common law duty to warn.38 4
a) Statutory Limits on Administrative Preemption. As
mentioned earlier, the HazCom Standard expressly
preempted "any legal requirements" which purported to
evaluate "the potential hhzards of chemicals, and
communicating information concerning hazards and
appropriate protective measures to employees." 385 This
language, if read broadly, might be construed to preempt
tort claims based on failure to provide adequate warnings.
However, the court cautioned that the preemptive effect of
this regulation could not exceed the preemptive scope of the
agency's enabling statute.38 6 In other words, a federal
agency could preempt state law only when it acted within
the scope of its congressionally delegated authority. 387 The
court in Welding Fume determined that the savings clause
had limited the power of OSHA to preempt state tort law by
enacting occupational health and safety standards. 388 Thus,
any attempt by OSHA to expressly preempt state tort law
entirely would be ultra vires.38 9 Instead, according to the
court, the HazCom Standard could only preempt state tort
law to the extent that there was a clear, unavoidable
conflict.3 90
b) The HazCom Standard's "Subject Matter." The
HazCom Standard purported to preempt any state or local
384. Id. at 690-97.
385. Id. at 690-91.
386. Id. at 690.
387. Id. at 691.
388. Id. at 691-92.
389. Id. at 692.
390. Id.
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legal requirements "pertaining to this subject."391 The
"subject" referred to in the Standard was the evaluation of
chemical hazards and the communication of information
about such hazards to employees.392 The issue, therefore,
was whether the subject matter of the HazCom Standard
was the same as the subject matter of the common law duty
to warn. If not, § 18(a) would leave the state free to regulate
since there would be no OSHA standard that regulated the
same activity.
As the court noted, the purpose of the HazCom
Standard was to "ensure that the hazards of all chemicals
produced or imported are evaluated, and that information
concerning their hazards is transmitted to employers and
employees. ' 393 The common law duty to warn, on the other
hand, was "a separate and different duty and does not arise
out of the employer/employee relationship."394 It was
directed primarily at manufacturers and suppliers of
welding rod products and not at the plaintiffs' employers. 395
Consequently, the court concluded that the "requirements"
imposed by the common law duty to warn did not pertain to
the same subject addressed by the HazCom Standard. This
conclusion was reinforced by the fact that preempting
common law tort claims would deprive injured workers of
any remedy. Echoing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 396 the
court in Welding Fume expressed doubt that Congress
without comment would allow OSHA to preempt tort
claims, especially in light of the OSH Act's savings
clause. 397
Although the court's narrow interpretation of the
phrase "pertaining to this subject," in the HazCom
Standard, namely the communication of information by
employers to employees, is plausible, it ignores the fact that
the Standard was designed to ensure that warnings
reached the ultimate user, by imposing a duty on each party
391. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(2) (2006).
392. Id.
393. Id. § 1910.1200(a)(1).
394. Welding Fume, 364 F.Supp. 2d at 693.
395. Id.
396. 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
397. See Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
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in the distributive chain to pass the information along to
the chain. 398 Thus, while the HazCom Standard spoke in
terms of employers and employees, its "subject matter" was
arguably to communication of information from product
manufacturer to workers at the end of the distributive
chain like the plaintiffs.
c) The Absence of an Actual Conflict. Under the Gade
analysis, if the common law duty to warn was not concerned
with the same subject matter as an OSHA standard, the
standard would not preempt such laws of general
applicability unless there was a substantial, clear or direct
conflict between them.399 Using this approach, the Welding
Fume court concluded that no conflict existed because the
defendants could comply with both state and federal
warning requirements. 400 In the first place, as the court
noted, the HazCom Standard imposed no duty to warn at
all on nonemployees or end-use consumers such as the
plaintiffs. 40 1 Furthermore, while the HazCom Standard
required suppliers of chemical products to "convey the
specific physical and health hazards of the chemicals"
involved,402 it did not require them to use any particular
language on their warning labels. 40 3 Indeed, as the Welding
Fume court observed, manufacturers of welding products
often used different language to comply with the HazCom
Standard.404 Thus, it was clear that the common law duty to
warn, whether based on negligence or strict liability in tort,
did not conflict with the HazCom Standard's requirement
that suppliers of chemical products provide "adequate"
warnings. 405
398. For a discussion of the benefits of this type of arrangement, see Richard
C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the
Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1185, 1226-39 (1996).
399. Gade, 505 U.S. at 107.
400. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 694-95.
401. Id. at 695.
402. Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(f)(5)(ii) (2006).
403. Welding Fume, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 695-96.
404. Id. at 696.
405. Id. at 697.
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C. Policy Considerations
When congressional intent is ambiguous, as it is in the
OSH Act, courts have considerable leeway when it comes to
deciding preemption issues. In such cases, public policy
considerations often play an important role in the court's
decision. In this case, the decision in Welding Fume is
consistent with such policies as federalism, product safety,
and risk spreading. On the other hand, policies such as
regulatory efficiency and tort reform arguably support a
different result.
Federalism values would seem to support a narrow
approach to preemption, especially when congressional
intent to preempt is ambiguous. Under the American
constitutional system of government, the states are
considered to be "sister sovereigns" and not just mere
political subdivisions of the central government. 406 This
arrangement is desirable because it encourages participa-
tion in the political process, thereby ensuring that
government officials are more responsive to public needs
and desires.407 In addition, the diffusion of power between
state and federal governments protects citizens against
overreaching or oppression by one branch of government by
providing a counterweight. 40 8 A federal approach also
promotes diversity by allowing cultural differences to find
expression in different places. 409 Finally, the American
federal system allows states to serve as "social
406. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (declaring that "our
Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and
the Federal Government").
407. See Drummonds, supra note 30, at 522-23.
408. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (stating that
"federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power") (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991));
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (declaring that "[]ust as the separation and
independence of the coordinate Branches of the Federal Government serves to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one Branch, a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front").
409. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 854 (1979).
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laboratories," experimenting with new solutions to social
and economic problems. 410
Even though the national government's powers have
steadily increased over the years,411 the states continue to
exercise substantial powers, especially in the areas of public
health and safety.4 12 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
the role of the states in the federal system, declaring that
the historic police powers of the states will not be
superseded by federal legislation absent the "clear and
manifest" purpose of Congress. 41 3 Occupational safety and
health falls squarely within a traditional area of state
responsibility. Consequently, a court should not allow
either the OSH Act or the HazCom Standard to preempt
state tort law when a congressional intent to preempt is not
clearly manifested.
The promotion of product safety is also consistent with
a narrow view of preemption. State tort law doctrines
promote safety by shifting the costs of product-related
injuries from consumers to product manufacturers. This
forces manufacturers to choose between paying damages for
product-related injuries or spending money to prevent them
from occurring in the first place. However, this safety
incentive is greatly weakened when the preemption doc-
trine protects manufacturers against liability for the sale of
defective products. Consequently, product safety considera-
tions caution against a finding of preemption when a
federal statute says nothing about its effect on the validity
of state tort law.41 4
An important rationale behind strict products liability
is risk-spreading, the mechanism by which losses are
shifted from individual victims and spread among members
of a larger group. In the case of defective products, losses
410. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
411. See Kaden, supra note 409, at 857-83.
412. See Drummonds, supra note 30, at 526.
413. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
414. Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Preemption: A Judicial
Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 181, 224 (1991).
152 [Vol. 54
THE WELDING FUME CASE
are usually shifted to manufacturers who can spread losses
more efficiently than individual victims. 415 Since the
preemption doctrine immunizes manufacturers from
liability, it forces the victim, rather than the manufacturer,
to bear the personal injury loss. Thus, when a federal
regulatory statute is ambiguous, preemption should be
disfavored to avoid denying compensation to those injured
by defective products. Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. echoed this sentiment when
it declared that "[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."
4 16
However, one can argue that the risk-spreading
rationale is not as strong in OSH Act cases. Unlike most
accident victims, losses are already spread for workers
under the state workers compensation system. While
workers compensation benefits are usually much lower
than damage awards in tort cases, they are reasonably
generous in many states.
On the other hand, a broad view of preemption may
also help to achieve regulatory efficiency. Some commenta-
tors have argued that federal administrative agencies are
more qualified than courts to establish product safety
standards. 417 Not only are administrative standards clearer
and more specific than tort-based standards, 418 but with
their superior resources and technical expertise, federal
agencies are usually better qualified than lay judges and
jurors to develop technologically sound safety standards for
complex products. 419 Finally, agency decision-making
415. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of
Risk, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1966).
416. 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
417. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social
Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and
Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 76 (1989).
418. Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance
Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1218 (1996); James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory
Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 638 (1978).
419. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 335 (1985); Alan Schwartz,
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J.
353, 389 (1988).
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procedures are better suited than the courts to deal with
complex social, economic, and scientific issues. 420 This
argument seems particularly applicable to OSHA stan-
dards. OSHA receives information from NIOSH and its
safety and health standards are created by formal
rulemaking procedures. This means that the agency
receives comments on the proposed standard from industry
representatives, scientists, and public interest groups.
Perhaps the most controversial argument for
preemption is that it promotes "tort reform." Preemption
can be viewed as a "super-strong" version of the regulatory
compliance defense for manufacturers whose products
comply with regulatory standards. 421 If one believes that
regulatory standards are generally422 optimal, rather than
minimal, a strong argument can be made for dismissing
lawsuits that implicitly attack the adequacy of these
standards. Therefore, if OSHA standards are also regarded
as optimal, it may make sense to preempt lawsuits such as
Welding Fume. Preempting lawsuits against manufacturers
by workers also forces workers to rely on workers
compensation benefits and gets rid of the wasteful and
duplicative system of dual compensation that currently
exists.423
D. A Final Assessment of the Welding Fume Decision
The Welding Fume decision is doctrinally sound and
seems to be consistent with Congress's view of the roles of
federal and state law in the area of occupational safety and
health. The presumption against preemption and the
savings clause support a narrow interpretation of the stat-
ute's rather ambiguous preemptive language and suggest
420. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers'
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531,
1540-42 (1973).
421. See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims
as the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903 (1996).
422. Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compliance,
88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2074 (2000) (stating that FDA regulations are intended to be
optimal rather than minimal).
423. Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for
Product-Related Injuries, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 669, 706-07 (1997).
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that Congress had no desire to foreclose tort claims by
injured workers against product manufacturers.
The court's treatment of the HazCom Standard is
somewhat less persuasive. Although an administrative
agency cannot preempt state law when Congress has clearly
limited its powers, it is difficult to know what Congress'
intent was in this case. Likewise, one can question the
court's assertion that the HazCom Standard only regulates
employer-employee relationships.
In addition, Welding Fume decision is consistent with
federalism values. The states, as well as the federal
government, have a significant interest in regulating occu-
pational safety and health. Moreover, the states have a
legitimate desire to ensure that workers receive fair
compensation when they are injured. Finally, by allowing
injured consumers to sue the manufacturers of defective
products, the Welding Fume decision promotes many of the
safety and risk-spreading goals of modern products liability
law.
CONCLUSION
The structure of the OSH Act, with its savings clause
and provision for state regulation, strongly suggests that it
is not intended to preempt state tort claims. 424 The HazCom
Standard does contain a preemption provision which
arguably preempts failure-to-warn claims. However, the
court in Welding Fume concluded that OSHA had no
authority to preempt such claims unless there was a direct
and unavoidable conflict. The court's reasoning in that case
was persuasive and its decision seems consistent with
congressional intent and public policy.
424. OWEN, supra note 4, §14.4, at 918-19.
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